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NO. 46631-2018
BANNOCK COUNTY NO. CR-2017-11638

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Mr. Quagigant pled guilty to one count of attempted strangulation, and the district court
imposed a sentence of eleven years, with four years fixed, but retained jurisdiction. On appeal,
Mr. Quagigant asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
underlying sentence.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In April of 2017, an officer responded to a medical center in Pocatello to investigate an
alleged domestic violence incident. (Presentence Report (PSI), p.5.) 1 The victim reported that
Mr. Quagigant was "an on-and-off boyfriend with whom she had one child .... " (PSI, p.5.)
She said Mr. Quagigant came to her residence the night before, but she refused to let him in
because he had been drinking. (PSI, p.5.) She explained that Mr. Quagigant forced his way in,
and was mad at her because she would not answer her phone or let him in the home. (PSI, p.5.)
She stated that Mr. Quagigant would not let her leave, took her phone and keys from her, and
"punched her in the right cheekbone." (PSI, p.5.) She also told the officer that, approximately
two days prior to this incident, Mr. Quagigant had "grabbed her by the neck, pushed her up
against the wall, and squeezed" during an argument. (PSI, p.5.)
Subsequently, the State charged Mr. Quagigant with one count of attempted
strangulation. (R., pp.50-51.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Quagigant pled guilty to the
charge, and the State agreed to recommend that the district court retain jurisdiction. (R., pp.19298; 8/13/18 Tr., p.8, Ls.9-11, p.12, L.9 - p.14, L.22.) At the sentencing hearing, the State
recommended the district court impose a sentence of ten years, with four years fixed, and retain
jurisdiction. (11/1/18 Tr., p.19, Ls.12-16.) Mr. Quagigant's counsel requested that the district
court withhold judgment and place Mr. Quagigant on probation. (11/1/18 Tr., p.27, Ls.5-7.) In
the alternative, he requested that the court impose a sentence of six years, with two years fixed,
and retain jurisdiction. (11/1/18 Tr., p.27, Ls.8-9.) The district court imposed a sentence of
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All citations to the PSI refer to the 54-page electronic document.
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eleven years, with four years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. 2 (11/1/18 Tr., p.31, Ls.17-20;
R., pp.213-15.) Mr. Quagigant filed a timely notice of appeal. 3 (R., pp.217-19.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed an underlying sentence of eleven
years, with four years fixed, following Mr. Quagigant's plea of guilty to one count of attempted
strangulation?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed An Underlying Sentence Of Eleven
Years, With Four Years Fixed, Following Mr. Quagigant's Plea Of Guilty To One Count Of
Attempted Strangulation
Given the facts of this case, Mr. Quagigant's underlying sentence of eleven years, with
four years fixed, is excessive because it is not necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing.
When there is a claim that the sentencing court imposed an excessive sentence, this Court will
conduct "an independent review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense,
the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest." State v. McIntosh, 160
Idaho 1, 8 (2016). In such a review, the Court "considers the entire length of the sentence under
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Mr. Quagigant successfully completed his rider, and the district court placed him on probation
on August 15, 2019. See https://mycourts.idaho.gov/odysseyportal/ - last accessed August 22,
2019.
3
The notice of appeal was timely (although perhaps premature), as to a challenge of the
underlying sentence in the judgment of conviction. See I.AR. 14(a) ("If, at the time of
judgment, the district court retains jurisdiction pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2601(4), the length
of time to file an appeal from the sentence contained in the criminal judgment shall be enlarged
by the length of time between entry of the judgment of conviction and entry of the order
relinquishing jurisdiction or placing the defendant on probation; provided, however, that all other
appeals challenging the judgment must be brought within 42 days of that judgment.");
I.AR. 17(e)(2) ("A notice of appeal filed from an appealable judgment or order before formal
written entry of such document shall become valid upon the filing and the placing the stamp of
the clerk of the court on such appealable judgment or order, without refiling the notice of
appeal.").
3

an abuse of discretion standard." Id. An appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry when an
exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal. It considers whether the trial court "(1) correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion;
(3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it;
and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason." Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho
856, 863 (2018).
The fourth factor is the most important for sentencing purposes, and the one that is absent
in this case. "When a trial court exercises its discretion in sentencing, 'the most fundamental
requirement is reasonableness."' McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8 (quoting State v. Hooper, 119 Idaho
606, 608 (1991)). Unless it appears that the length of the sentence is "necessary to accomplish
the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution," the sentence is unreasonable. Id. When a sentence is
excessive "considering any view of the facts," because it is not necessary to achieve these goals,
it is unreasonable and therefore an abuse of discretion. Id.
There are several mitigating factors that illustrate why Mr. Quagigant's underlying
sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.

First, this offense was

Mr. Quagigant's first felony conviction. (PSI, pp.7-11.) The lack of a serious prior record has
long been recognized as mitigating information. See e.g., State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982)
(reducing sentence where conviction ''was the defendant's first felony with no prior history of
any sexual violations").
Additionally, Mr. Quagigant accepted responsibility for this offense. At the sentencing
hearing, he told the district court that he had a lot of time to think about his actions, and he took
"full responsibility" for the crime. (11/1/18 Tr., p.27, L.15 - p.28, L.6.) This should also be
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considered as mitigating information. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982) (reducing the
defendant's sentence, in part, because "the defendant has accepted responsibility for his acts").
Similarly, a defendant's expressions of remorse should be considered by the court as a
mitigating factor.

State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that some

leniency was required, in part, because the defendant expressed "remorse for his conduct"). In
this case, when asked about the crime, Mr. Quagigant said he was "truly remorseful" for his
actions. (PSI, p.7.) And, in his comments to the court, he said he was "really sorry" for what he
did, and he wanted to say he was sorry to the courts, and to the people that he loved. (PSI, p.17.)
Additionally, at the sentencing hearing, he said, "I really am sorry for what I have done."
(11/1/18 Tr., p.27, Ls.17-18.)
Nevertheless, the district court imposed an underlying sentence of eleven years, with four
years fixed. Mr. Quagigant submits that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed
this extended underlying sentence because it did not adequately consider the mitigating
information in his case. That information shows that his underlying sentence was excessive and
unreasonable because it was not necessary to achieve goals of sentencing. As such, he asserts
the district court failed to reach its sentencing decision through an exercise of reason.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Quagigant respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate.
DATED this 23 rd day of August, 2019.

I sf Reed P. Anderson
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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